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Patronising the mentally disordered? Social landlords and the 
control of ‘anti-social behaviour’ under the Disability 







The recently enacted Disability Discrimination Act 2005 will extend and 
intensify the protection from discrimination afforded to disabled people by the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (‘the DDA’).1 This may seem a welcome 
development: the original legislation, an expedient enacted reluctantly in the 
face of an increasingly vocal Disability Rights Movement, has long been 
criticised as less than comprehensive. In recent months, however, litigation 
has raised new concerns that as it stands the DDA, a ‘hasty and unwieldy 
political compromise’,2 may in certain contexts be over-inclusive, with 
unforeseen and unwelcome ramifications for other aspects of social policy. The 
particular issue highlighted by the leading case of Manchester City Council v 
Romano and Samari,3 which this article explores, is the tension between the 
duty of social landlords not to discriminate against the mentally disordered, and 
their responsibility to protect the residents of social housing from so-called 
‘anti-social behaviour’. Sections 22 to 24 of the DDA, which prohibit 
discrimination in housing provision, restrict the circumstances in which a 
landlord can take action to control anti-social behaviour ‘related’ to certain 
mental disorders. In particular, exclusion from social housing on grounds of 
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such conduct, through either refusal to allocate property, or eviction, will be 
discriminatory, and therefore illegal, unless it can be justified as necessary to 
protect the health or safety of other residents.  
The first part of this paper positions the DDA against the backdrop of 
contemporary housing policy, as characterised by followers of Foucault’s work 
on governmentality.4 It notes that whilst access to the sector is ostensibly 
governed by the principle of need, this welfarist objective has been subverted 
in the face of the anxieties of what Nikolas Rose describes as advanced liberal 
government;5 in particular, the threat posed by certain categories of ‘risky’ 
subject.6 In an effort to combat anti-social behaviour, occupation of social 
housing is presented as conditional upon the exercise of responsible moral 
agency. For those who fail to align their conduct accordingly, that conditionality 
may be enforced, with an individual excluded from the sector notwithstanding 
his need. Two rationalities are employed to justify departure from welfarism in 
such circumstances. On the one hand, exclusion is viewed as necessary to 
control risks that a provider is unwilling or unable to underwrite. On the other, 
those who fail to satisfy the conditions of their occupation are characterised as 
morally irresponsible; personally blameworthy for their failure to take 
responsibility for their conduct, and as such undeserving of the benefit of 
occupation within the sector.  
The paper goes on to draw attention to the problems that arise when 
these justifications for exclusion, grounded in rationalities of risk and 
responsibility, are applied to the paradigm of the mentally disordered tenant. 
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Key to this analysis is the premise that diagnosis of a mental disorder brings 
individuals within what sociologists term the ‘medical model’; an interpretive 
tool used to explain a range of deviant behaviour. The medical model, I argue, 
operates according to particular governmental rationalities, in tension with 
those evident within housing policy. First, under the medical model, health and 
welfare professionals are engaged as sources of expert knowledge (and 
power) relating to the management of the risky subject. Their focus upon 
reduction of risk through the inclusionary techniques of treatment and support 
may conflict, however, with the exclusionary risk strategies employed by 
housing managers. Second, the medical model problematizes the rationality of 
the morally irresponsible anti-social tenant. It treats the mentally disordered as 
incapable of responsible agency, and therefore blameless for their actions. 
Rather than morally irresponsible the mentally disordered are constructed as 
morally non-responsible, challenging the appropriateness of their subjection to 
the moral obligations of conditional housing provision. As the paper explores, 
however, this assumption of non-responsibility is itself controversial. Both 
moral philosophers and mental health professionals question whether medical 
classification of a mental disorder should always absolve an individual of the 
capacity for responsible agency. Indeed, moral discourses continue to operate 
in relation to the anti-social behaviour of the mentally disordered, with 
individuals, in certain circumstances, expected to take responsibility for their 
behaviour. 
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The second and final part of the paper argues that criticism levelled at the 
restrictions on conditionality imposed by the DDA mirror the discourses of 
advanced liberal housing policy. It notes first the explicit concern of the Court 
of Appeal in Romano with the management of risk through exclusion: that the 
‘health and safety’ justification is inadequate to ensure protection of other 
residents and providers from the full range of threats posed by the mentally 
disordered, and its consequent attempt to neutralise the legislation. However, 
the paper then explores a further, implicit, concern that the DDA incorporates 
into law the medical model’s assumption of non-responsibility. By precluding 
exclusion (in the absence of a risk to health or safety) simply on grounds of a 
causal mental disorder, an individual is no longer obliged to exercise 
responsible agency as a condition of his occupation, even when he might be 
deemed capable of doing so. This outcome has two consequences. Principally, 
the legislation limits the ability of providers to shape the conduct of anti-social 
tenants through conditionality. It has been suggested, however, that the DDA 
is a threat not only to providers, but the mentally disordered themselves, by 
patronising those it seeks to protect. Its assumption that the mentally 
disordered as a class are intrinsically incapable of responsible agency is 
arguably as an affront to their dignity, which anti-discrimination law in particular 
purports to champion.  
The paper concludes, however, by questioning whether the power to 
encourage responsible moral agency amongst the mentally disordered through 
conditionality is really of greater value than tackling their social exclusion 
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through the provision of stable housing, suggesting that the DDA, in some 
modified form, is perhaps a welcome reinforcement of welfarism within the 
sector. 
 
(2) Policy conflicts: social exclusion, housing and the mentally disordered 
 
In May 2003 the government’s Social Exclusion Unit (‘the SEU’) engaged 
in a major consultation exercise, which sought to establish reasons for, and 
solutions to, the particular exclusion experienced by people with mental health 
problems. Its final report, published in June 2004, emphasises the stigma and 
discrimination still experienced by the mentally disordered, and the difficulties 
they face in accessing basic services, often exacerbating their symptoms.7  
Housing problems are highlighted as a fundamental issue in the report, 
part of ‘getting the basics right’, as ‘decent and stable housing is critical to 
providing a sense of security’.8 The document notes particularly that the 
mentally disordered are one and a half times more likely to live in rented 
accommodation, and so stresses the need to ensure that renters are helped to 
secure appropriate accommodation and supported in sustaining their 
tenancies. This is a problem faced particularly by social landlords. Social 
housing has developed as a ‘safety-net’ tenure, providing residual 
accommodation for many of the most vulnerable and marginalised in society.9 
The mentally disordered make up around nine per cent of applicants accepted 
by local housing authorities (‘LHAs’) in England under homelessness 
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legislation on grounds of priority need, a figure that has continued to rise since 
1997. Of these, a high proportion experience what the SEU’s report describes 
as ‘severe and enduring’ mental health problems, yet they are housed in 
mainstream accommodation following the closure of long-stay psychiatric 
hospitals and the development of care in the community policies. However, 
reductions in LHA stock as a consequence of the Right to Buy and Large Scale 
Voluntary Transfers means they are increasingly housed by Registered Social 
Landlords (‘RSLs’) and other voluntary organisations, which often operate 
specialist supported housing for this purpose.10 
Whilst the SEU’s report is a welcome development in policy towards 
mental disorder, it is a limited analysis in at least one important way. It is 
notable that the document makes no mention of the threat to the social 
inclusion of the mentally disordered posed by the government’s anti-social 
behaviour strategy. The government has made clear that tackling ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ – low-level disorder affecting the quality of life of residents in their 
neighbourhoods – is one of its highest priorities.11 It has adopted a highly 
punitive approach to the problem, exemplified perhaps by the ubiquitous anti-
social behaviour order (‘ASBO’).12 However, there has been little 
acknowledgement that a substantial proportion of the perpetrators of such 
conduct have mental health problems.13 Certain conditions such as bipolar 
disorder, schizophrenia, severe depression and personality disorders, can 
manifest in behaviour that may appear threatening, or negatively affect the 
quality of life of neighbours.14 As the mental health charity MIND noted during 
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the SEU’s consultation process, the prevalence of psychiatric conditions 
among those targeted for their so-called anti-social behaviour could well lead 
to further stigmatisation of mental disorder, intensifying the social exclusion of 
this group.15 Attention has been drawn particularly to the controversial use of 
ASBOs to control the symptoms of autism and Tourette’s syndrome.16 
These policies have serious implications too for the access of the 
mentally disordered to social housing, upon which they are so reliant. The 
government continues to present anti-social behaviour as a problem occurring 
predominantly around areas of social housing,17 and as such social landlords 
are expected to take responsibility for its control. Under section 218A of the 
Housing Act 199618 they are now required to construct policies and procedures 
for its reduction,19 further reinforcing Cowan’s earlier claim that ‘housing and 
its management has become a crucial part of the crime control industry; 
housing departments have become intermediators in the new criminal justice 
system’.20 To that end, over the last decade housing providers have been 
granted a range of statutory powers enabling them to better control access to, 
and continued occupation of, their housing on behavioural grounds. The 
traditional nuisance grounds for eviction under the assured and secure tenancy 
regimes have been extended,21 and new low-security tenancies developed. 
The introductory tenancy allows LHAs to evict a household easily during the 
first year,22 extendable by a further six months.23 Whilst the introductory 
tenancy is unavailable to housing associations, the Housing Corporation 
encourages Registered Social Landlords (‘RSLs’) to use what are colloquially 
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termed ‘probationary’ tenancies: low-security assured shorthold tenancies 
again imposed for the first year of occupation. The more recent demotion 
regime enables all social landlords to reduce security to that of an introductory 
tenancy at any time.24 Finally, allocation processes have been harnessed to 
achieve crime control objectives. LHAs are able to exclude housing applicants 
with a history of anti-social behaviour from their waiting lists for housing 
accommodation, or else give them lower priority on those lists,25 whilst 
guidance on the operation of the homelessness legislation now specifically 
cites eviction as a result of anti-social behaviour as ‘intentional homelessness’, 
absolving LHAs from their duty to rehouse the applicant.26  
MIND has voiced particular concern about the effect of these new housing 
management powers.27 Whilst within the SEU’s report the government might 
talk of supporting the mentally disordered in their tenancies, it suggests that 
the measures may instead encourage greater use of eviction by social 
landlords as a solution to complaints about their behaviour, exacerbating 
homelessness amongst a group already highly susceptible to this problem.28 
As Brooke LJ was prepared to concede in Romano, ‘[t]o remove someone 
from their home may be a traumatic thing to do in the case of many who are 
not mentally impaired. It may be even more traumatic for the mentally 
impaired.’29 It is likely too that for mentally disordered individuals reliant on 
social housing, exclusion from allocation lists for past behaviour may leave 
them without adequate alternative housing options. It is this underlying tension 
between the promotion of stable accommodation for the mentally disordered, 
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and the increasing concern of social landlords with anti-social behaviour, that 
forms the basis of this article.  
 
(3) Justifying exclusion from social housing: risk and responsibility 
 
It is a common assertion that contemporary social housing policy and 
practice are dictated by a discourse of need.30 This claim is supported by a 
glance at the legislative systems regulating allocation procedures, which grant 
priority status to a diminishing quantity of stock to certain categories of 
vulnerable individual. The mentally disordered are specifically protected in this 
way. Following criticism that ‘care in the community policies’ were developed 
without clear enough consideration of their implications for housing policy,31 
the Housing Act 1996 now provides that where an individual is vulnerable as a 
result of his disorder, he should be granted specific priority under both general 
allocation schemes and the homelessness legislation.32 Housing 
commentators recognise, however, that the welfarist objectives underpinning 
the principle of need are increasingly threatened by the concern of advanced 
liberalism with the effective governance of ‘risky’ subjects. The progressive 
residualisation and marginalisation of social housing has brought within it a 
disproportionate concentration of such individuals. Its occupants are 
characterised consequently as a targeted population,33 requiring intensive 
governance by housing providers and other agencies.34 On the one hand, the 
often serious vulnerabilities suffered by many tenants, including mental 
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disorder, place them at risk, particularly from social exclusion. On the other, 
however, those same individuals may also pose risks to their housing 
providers and/or the wider community. Perhaps the most likely of these latter 
external risks is difficulty with the payment of rent, which may threaten the 
economic viability of a landlord. The focus of this article, however, is the 
problem of anti-social behaviour. The anti-social tenant is viewed within 
housing policy as a risk not only to the quality of life of individual residents, but 
the reputation of entire estates or neighbourhoods and the possibility that they 
will become, or remain, ‘difficult-to-let’.35  
Governmentality theorists have noted the various and subtle ways in 
which contemporary advanced liberalism; an often incoherent combination of 
neo-liberal, communitarian and neo-conservative ideology,36 attempts to 
govern risky subjects by shaping them as self-regulating ‘active citizens’, 
capable of aligning themselves to constructed norms of behaviour.37 For John 
Flint, social housing provision provides an important example of these 
developments. The welfare state is viewed increasingly as a moral hazard to 
those it serves; blamed for creating a dependency culture which reduces the 
individual responsibility of recipients. As such, occupants of social housing are 
encouraged by providers, through a range of what Foucault terms technologies 
of self, to engage as responsible tenants.38 Tenants are persuaded first to 
behave as ‘active consumers’, capable of exercising choice in respect of the 
housing ‘product’.39 Second, they are reconstructed as ‘moral members of 
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responsible communities’ willing and able to refrain from anti-social 
behaviour.40  
The ultimate technology employed by providers to shape this latter 
responsible moral agency is conditionality of housing provision: an individual’s 
entitlement to occupation within the sector is increasingly dependent upon 
satisfying certain conditions of behaviour.41 Whilst technologies of self such as 
conditionality may well succeed in changing behaviour, the concern of this 
paper is the anti-social tenant who fails to align his conduct as required. For 
this individual, technologies of the self are likely to give way to increasingly 
disciplinary forms of control. The severest of these technologies, of course, is 
exclusion from the sector altogether, as conditionality is enforced. One can see 
then the tension within advanced liberal housing policy between the principles 
of need and conditionality. Two justifications, however, are deployed to support 
exclusion from social housing in such circumstances. 
First, a landlord may consider itself unable to underwrite the risk posed by 
an anti-social individual who proves resistant to technologies of self. Risky 
individuals are increasingly difficult to accommodate within social housing, 
given the pressures of managerialism on the sector.42 Exclusion from social 
housing is viewed as a way to manage that risk, by physically removing 
recalcitrant perpetrators from a particular housing environment. Providers 
increasingly govern access to the sector through assessments of risk as well 
as need,43 with the legal infrastructure governing access to the sector modified 
accordingly. Risk assessments are employed within allocation decision-
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making, enabling exclusion of individuals on application.44 Introductory 
tenancies extend the operation of these processes by providing a further 
opportunity to assess risk in situ, whilst retaining the power to evict an 
occupant easily if that risk materialises. Thereafter, exclusion is still possible 
under the secure and assured tenancies, though considerably more difficult 
because the requirement of reasonableness enables a court to balance the 
effect of eviction on vulnerable households.45 Yet even here the discourse of 
risk has taken precedence over need. Whilst the effect of nuisance behaviour 
on other residents must always be taken into account,46 a statutory structure to 
the courts’ discretion incorporated by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 now 
demands that primary consideration should be given to the effect of the 
offending conduct on others if it were to continue.47 
Second, exclusion is further justified by ascribing personal responsibility 
and blame to the tenant for his failure to take responsibility for his actions. Anti-
social behaviour is treated within government discourse as the product of a 
moral deficit on the part of the individual perpetrator; its cause simply a 
problem of disrespect.48  As the government elaborates in its White Paper 
Respect and Responsibility: 
 
‘[t]he common element in all anti-social behaviour is that it 
represents a lack of respect or consideration for other people. It shows a 
selfish inability or unwillingness to recognise when one’s individual 
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behaviour is offensive to others, and a refusal to take responsibility for 
it.’49 
 
Haworth and Manzi suggest that this individualistic, moralistic approach to the 
cause of anti-social behaviour permeates the discourses of housing 
management.50 Anti-social tenants alone are to blame for their failure to satisfy 
the conditions of their occupation. They are capable, but unwilling, to take 
responsibility for their conduct. As such, the excluded perpetrator no longer 
deserves to be a social tenant, whilst exclusion allows limited housing 
resources to be re-allocated to other, more ‘deserving’, applicants.  
 A key consequence of this construction of the ‘irresponsible’ anti-social 
individual is a refusal to absolve perpetrators from blame for their conduct on 
grounds of their own difficult circumstances. As the government emphasises:  
 
‘Family problems, poor educational attainment, unemployment, and 
alcohol and drug misuse can all contribute to anti-social behaviour. But 
none of these problems can be used as an excuse for ruining other 
people’s lives. Fundamentally, anti-social behaviour is caused by a lack of 
respect for other people.’51 
 
One finds then rejection by government of structural explanations of anti-social 
behaviour as the product of socio-economic deprivation.52 Instead, there is an 
emphasis, highlighting the influence of neo-conservatism upon the 
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government’s communitarian agenda, of the need ‘to reintroduce the notion of 
blame, and sharply reduce our readiness to call people ‘victims’’.53 Individuals 
are culpable irrespective of these mitigating factors, because ultimately they 
can still choose to behave appropriately. Housing providers, once again, 
appear to have drawn directly from these assumptions; for Brown, ‘the 
discourse [within the sector] is one of ‘common sense’ morality rather than 
pathology’.54  
 
(4) Problematizing mental disorder: the medical model 
 
Advanced liberalism, as applied through social housing policy, justifies 
exclusion of anti-social tenants on grounds of their failure as responsible moral 
agents.  Not only is it necessary in certain circumstances to manage the risk 
they pose to others, but given that that failure is simply a problem of 
irresponsibility, those excluded are blameworthy and so undeserving of further 
welfare provision. This section, however, problematizes these justifications 
through their application to the paradigm of the mentally disordered tenant. 
‘Mentally disordered’, for the purpose of this paper, refers simply to any person 
diagnosed with a psychiatric condition by a clinician. Through the process of 
medical classification, an individual is drawn within what sociologists term the 
‘medical model’;55 a tool employed to explain a range of deviant behaviour. 
Robert Veatch suggests that a particular deviancy will be classified under the 
medical model ‘if it is judged (a) involuntary and (b) organic, if (c) the class of 
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relevant, technically competent experts is physicians, and if (d) it falls below 
some socially defined minimal standard of acceptability’.56 These assumed 
characteristics of the mentally disordered have two important implications for 
the rationalities of risk and responsibility that guide governance of anti-social 
tenants through exclusion.  
 
(a) Medico-welfare professionals as experts 
  
 Foucault contends that knowledge is essential to the exercise of power 
through governance.57 Housing professionals undoubtedly have claim to sole 
expertise in many areas of housing management. Diagnosis of a mental 
disorder, however, establishes competing sources of knowledge/power which 
providers must negotiate. Under the medical model, as noted by Veatch, 
health professionals are identified as ‘technically competent experts’, with the 
training necessary to both classify and treat an individual’s psychiatric 
condition. I would argue that diagnosis also draws welfare professionals such 
as social workers within this category, given their various duties to support 
those vulnerable as a result of their disorders.58 There is clearly potential for 
conflict between the approaches of medico-welfare and housing professionals 
to the governance of the mentally disordered. The sole concern of medico-
welfare professionals is the risk that a mentally disordered subject poses to 
himself. As such, they will inevitably seek to ensure that they are maintained 
within the social rented sector irrespective of the risk their conduct poses to 
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others.59 The disruption associated with homelessness through lack of other 
feasible housing options, or the instability of private renting, has been shown to 
exacerbate psychiatric conditions.60 Indeed, as Cowan argues, maintaining the 
mentally disordered within the social rented sector following 
deinstitutionalisation was itself a form of risk management. They were 
identified as having priority need for social housing, because without settled 
accommodation they were thought to pose a risk to themselves.61  
 Possession proceedings, as we shall see, are often the setting for 
conflicts of knowledge and expertise between housing providers and medico-
welfare professionals. However, where there exists the possibility of conflict 
one finds too the opportunity for productive co-operation. Efforts have been 
made by the government to encourage greater inter-agency partnership 
between welfare agencies. Such joined-up thinking reflects an epistemological 
move towards the sharing of knowledge of a particular subject between 
agencies,62 enabling the incorporation of medico-welfare expertise into a 
landlords’ approach to risk management.63 This can have beneficial 
consequences. Supporting the mentally disordered in their tenancies, rather 
than excluding them, may well prove a superior risk management strategy for 
housing providers expected, unlike medico-welfare professionals, to protect 
residents of their housing from anti-social behaviour. It is generally accepted 
that rather than controlling risk, exclusion simply transposes it elsewhere; often 
into the private rented sector where the possibility for governance is weakened 
considerably.64 In some cases the same communities may face that risk again 
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as the perpetrator is re-housed in the locality. Moreover, if exclusion 
exacerbates the disorder, an individual poses a greater risk not only to himself, 
but to others as well. This suggests the need for a move away from punitive 
responses to anti-social behaviour towards holistic, preventative solutions. 
There is an emphasis particularly upon early intervention to prevent tenancy 
breakdown. Negotiation between agencies can lead to the cessation of legal 
proceedings, as other non-legal solutions are identified.65 
 For many housing providers, partnership working of this kind is already 
intrinsic to their operations. Specialist supported housing organisations in 
particular draw together the provision of housing with treatment and support 
services. 66 General housing providers too are increasingly establishing 
protocols to ensure that resort to legal sanctions is preceded by an 
assessment of the mental health of the individual, the bearing this may have 
on his behaviour and the possibility of support or treatment of a diagnosed 
condition.67 These holistic approaches can only improve under the 
government’s Supporting People programme. However, inter-agency 
cooperation is not always what it should be.68 Housing managers, most likely 
general providers, who fail to engage with other agencies may have no 
knowledge of a tenant’s condition until a late stage in legal proceedings. Of 
course, housing providers are not always the problem. Evidence suggests that 
social services often fail to respond to the requests for assistance from 
landlords, with possession proceedings sometimes initiated in an effort to 
attract the attention of uncooperative agencies.69 
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 (b) The mentally disordered as non-responsible agents 
 
 Exclusion of the anti-social from social housing is justified by the 
assumption that an individual is solely responsible for his failure to satisfy the 
conditions of his occupation, and as such is appropriately blamed for his failure 
to satisfy the conditions of his occupation. Structural explanations of conduct 
are abandoned in favour of those emphasising individual moral deficit. 
Commentators continue to argue, however, that these structural problems 
should indeed mitigate responsibility for bad behaviour. It is unfair to place fault 
solely upon the shoulders of the individual, when externalities for which they 
are not responsible impinge upon their capacity to behave appropriately. This 
appears to be the implication behind Pauline Papps’ suggestion that it is 
inappropriate for the government to disregard ‘wider issues and problems 
faced by the perpetrators, which are often beyond their control’.70 Criticism of 
this kind resonates particularly with the attitudes of many towards mental 
disorder. Psychiatric conditions are even more difficult to disassociate from 
anti-social behaviour than socio-economic circumstance because of the impact 
they are presumed to have upon an individual’s capacity for control his actions. 
The paradigm of the mentally disordered tenant illustrates the danger of 
mislabelling inherent in a concept as nebulous as anti-social behaviour. The 
government’s explanation of all such conduct as a matter of disrespect is 
obviously inadequate when applied to the mentally disordered, highlighting the 
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way in which such political sloganeering has the potential, as MIND argues, to 
stigmatise the mentally disordered through their elision with the archetype of 
the anti-social ‘yob’.71 
 The medical model takes a particular approach to the responsibility of the 
mentally disordered. As Veatch suggests, it assumes that the actions of those 
diagnosed with a psychiatric condition are entirely non-voluntary. It treats all 
anti-social conduct of the mentally disordered as the symptom of illness - the 
product of a chemical or biological imbalance in the brain - and, as such, a 
problem of pathology rather than morality. Blame and stigma are inappropriate 
reactions to such behaviour because the underlying condition is both imposed 
upon the individual and entirely out of his control. The medical model promotes 
then absolute exculpation of an individual of responsibility for his actions: 
 
‘A sinner or criminal or morally irresponsible person would be seen 
as deficient in character to the extent that he has brought on his condition; 
the person in the sick role is not. More significantly, one in the sick role is 
not expected to use willpower or self-control to overcome his condition’.72 
 
The mentally disordered are incapable of exercising, rather than unwilling to 
exercise, responsible moral agency. Rather than morally irresponsible, they 
are characterised as non-responsible. This assumption of non-responsibility 
poses serious problems for the operation of conditionality in social housing 
provision. As we have seen, exclusion from social housing is justified by 
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constructing the anti-social tenant as personally blameworthy for his failure to 
take responsibility for his actions. Under the medical model, however, the 
mentally disordered individual is blameless, and as such should not be 
subjected to the demands of conditionality. 
 The assumption of non-responsibility, however, is itself highly 
problematic. Few believe that the anti-social symptoms of those classified as 
mentally disordered are always, as Papps puts it, beyond an individual’s 
control, and that it is always unreasonable to expect them to take responsibility 
for their behaviour. The extent to which actions caused by a mental disorder 
should be treated as non-voluntary continues to tax theorists of action, 73 going 
to the heart of the unresolved debate between proponents of free will and 
determinism.74 The thesis of non-responsibility under the medical model is an 
example of hard determinism. However, Western philosophy, which tends to 
presume capacity for free will, demands much more than psychiatric 
classification to excuse an individual from responsibility for his actions. The 
moral philosopher Joel Feinberg, for instance, recognises the medical model’s 
tendency to reject ascription of blame. A psychiatrist ‘might hold it self-evident 
that sick people are not to be treated as responsible people; hence the criteria 
of illness are themselves criteria of non-responsibility’.75 He concludes, 
however, that this is undoubtedly a mistaken assumption: two additional 
criteria are required. It is necessary first to establish that the mental disorder is 
a “but for” cause of particular offending conduct. Second, in line with the 
Aristotelian approach to responsibility assumed in the West, philosophers of 
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action argue that to be entirely non-responsible a particular mental disorder 
must render an individual either incapable of controlling his behaviour, or else 
unable to rationalise what he is doing.76  
 For Feinberg, ‘not all neurotic and psychotic disorders, by any means, 
produce compulsive or delusionary symptoms’.77 Indeed, challenges to the 
medical model’s assumption of non-responsibility have also been made from a 
psychiatric perspective. Pamela Bjorklund, for instance, claims that in practice 
very few of those diagnosed with a psychiatric condition are ever entirely non-
responsible, continuing that ‘[i]n fact, their agency and responsibility admit 
degrees; and in any given instance of moral adjudication, the degrees, limits 
and boundaries of their (moral) responsibility are continuously negotiated and 
renegotiated’.78 This is a particularly interesting comment. It emphasises that, 
where a mental disorder does not fully exculpate, the moral expectations 
demanded of the mentally disordered are not absolute. Instead, the process of 
moral adjudication is constantly contested, with the outcome dependent upon 
the adjudicator, the particular subject, and all the circumstances within which 
the judgement is made. It is contended that two sources of knowledge tend to 
be drawn upon to assess the moral responsibility of an individual for his anti-
social conduct. On the one hand, an adjudicator will consider the degree to 
which he believes an individual is capable of exercising direct control over 
particular behaviour. On the other, he will often assess the individual according 
to his ‘meta-responsibility’. Edward Mitchell employs this term to explain the 
ascription of blame not for anti-social conduct itself, but for steps taken by the 
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individual to bring about or exacerbate the condition that causes that 
conduct.79 For example, an individual may engage in substance abuse, termed 
‘dual diagnosis’, which may increase the anti-social symptoms of a psychiatric 
condition. He may also fail to engage with support or treatment programs 
offered to him.  
Of course, it is impossible to identify with any precision the extent to 
which a particular individual’s conduct is caused by the disorder, or the extent 
to which he should be expected to control his anti-social conduct or contribute 
to the management of his condition to prevent it occurring. Neither neurologists 
nor psychiatrists have a ‘magic lantern to light up the concealed corners of a 
defendant’s mind’,80 dependent instead upon assessment of external 
manifestations of the condition. In terms of compulsion, for instance, Glanville 
Williams highlights the epistemological difficulty that:  
 
‘the step between “he did not resist his impulse” and “he could not 
resist his impulse” is incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori there is no 
scientific measurement of the degree of difficulty which an abnormal 
person finds in controlling his impulses’.81   
 
It is for this reason that moral adjudication of the mentally disordered is 
constantly contested. One thing, however, is clear: any such adjudication 
cannot be based upon the expertise of a housing provider alone. The simplistic 
moralism of housing management discourse is wholly inadequate. Only 
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through negotiation with medico-welfare professionals, who are inevitably 
better placed to assess an individual’s capacity for moral responsibility in light 
of their disorder, can a provider hope to engage in a meaningful assessment of 
moral blame. The exchange of knowledge through partnership is a necessary 
basis for meaningful governance of the mentally disordered subject through 
conditionality.  
As an illustration of the conflict between medical and moral models of 
responsibility, I want to look finally at the controversial status of the personality 
disorder. Anti-social behaviour may well be classified by clinicians as the 
product of a personality disorder. Note, for example, the symptoms of dissocial 
personality disorder, defined by the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (‘the ICD’) as follows: 
 
‘Personality disorder characterized by disregard for social 
obligations, and callous unconcern for the feelings of others. There is 
gross disparity between behaviour and the prevailing social norms. 
Behaviour is not readily modifiable by adverse experience, including 
punishment. There is a low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for 
discharge of aggression, including violence; there is a tendency to blame 
others, or to offer plausible rationalizations for the behaviour bringing the 
patient into conflict with society.’82 
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However, whilst personality disorders are formally recognised as psychiatric 
conditions by the ICD, considerable debate remains, even amongst members 
of the medical community, as to whether they actually constitute medical 
conditions at all. Famously, Thomas Szasz has questioned the very existence 
of mental illness. He argues that it represents a social construct rather than a 
disease, employed by doctors to explain any deviance from behavioural norms 
in medical terms.83 Whilst in light of recent scientific developments many would 
dispute Szasz’s analysis in relation to more established psychiatric conditions 
such as schizophrenia, it appears to hold continued relevance with respect to 
personality disorder. Commentators have argued that the psychiatric status of 
personality disorders is a form of professional imperialism over what are in fact 
simply extreme character traits,84 and continue to debate whether they are in 
fact susceptible to medical treatment.85 
 The problem is compounded by the fact that diagnosis of a personality 
disorder is a highly inexact science, justified simply on identification of 
behavioural symptoms by a psychiatrist. Indeed, a number of high profile 
medical professionals, concerned by the government’s proposals to enable the 
forcible detention of those diagnosed with severe personality disorders, have 
suggested recently in the British Medical Journal that ‘levels of agreement 
between clinicians about who should be classified in this way are often no 
better than chance’.86 Characteristics that might constitute a personality 
disorder under a psychiatric assessment are capable of classification under a 
moral model as merely a problem of self-discipline. There exists then a blurred 
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line between psychiatric condition and moral deficit, with classification, and the 
consequences of that classification, dictated unpredictably by the model, 
medical or moral, applied in a particular context. 
 One common concern arising from this debate is that classification of 
personality disorders impinges upon the responsibility of such individuals for 
their conduct. Bjorklund argues that unlike other mentally disordered 
individuals, those with personality disorders suffer from absolutely no 
impairment of either their volition or cognition,87 and as such are fully 
responsible for their behaviour. It is questionable then whether classification of 
a personality disorder should act as a mitigating, let alone exculpatory, 
characteristic. Suspicion of categorising personality disorders as medical 
conditions rather than moral characteristics, with the implications this has for 
the ascription of blame, is evident in the words of one medical commentator: 
 
‘[b]oth the psychodynamic and biological accounts of personality 
disorder, if indiscriminately applied, appear to diminish personal 
responsibility. If personality disorder justifies mitigation in the forensic 
setting, then large numbers of people in society are walking about with a 
trump card, to be played should they ever go to court’.88 
 
(c) The medical model in the legal arena 
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We will return to the capacity of the mentally disordered for responsible 
moral agency later when evaluating the criticisms levelled at the operation of 
the DDA. For now, however, it is perhaps useful to illuminate the previous 
discussion through an examination of the approach to mental disorder with 
legal proceedings. In Croydon Borough Council v Moody,89 the defendant was 
a local authority tenant of 61 years of age, whose erratic and alarming 
behaviour had led to the bringing of possession proceedings by his landlord. 
The trial judge heard evidence from a professional psychiatrist that the 
defendant suffered from a combination of an obsessive personality disorder 
and dementia. The evidence also suggested that the conduct could be 
successfully treated, and as such it was argued that eviction would be 
unreasonable. The trial judge, however, refused to acknowledge that the 
defendant had a mental health problem at all, and held that a possession order 
should be granted. The judge added: 
 
‘Whether the behaviour is deliberate - I have no reason to doubt that 
it is deliberate - and the intention behind the behaviour - the intention in 
my judgment is to get his own way in respect of anything which concerns 
him and the opinions and feelings of other people are irrelevant … The 
medical evidence does not persuade me any way that the defendant does 
not know precisely how his actions affect other people. He may well have 
a personality disorder and it may well be treatable. Applying a certain 
degree of robustness it might well be said that a little of self-discipline, 
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coupled with a good deal of consideration for other people’s feelings, 
would be appropriate. But I strongly feel that that is an impossible 
outcome to this case.’90 
 
The decision was ultimately overturned by the Court of Appeal, which was 
noticeably surprised by the judge’s interpretation of the medical evidence. It 
concluded that the medical evidence was in fact entirely acceptable, and as 
such the possibility of treatment for the disorder was a relevant consideration 
that should have been taken into account.  
 A number of points can be drawn from this decision. It illustrates, first, the 
conflicts of knowledge and power that can arise between the competing 
approaches of medico-welfare professionals and housing providers to the 
management of the risky subject. On the one hand, the plaintiff landlord wishes 
to exclude to manage the risk. On the other, the health professional advocates 
treatment and warns of the consequences of eviction on the condition. The 
court emerges here as the final arbiter between these concerns. Second, the 
refusal of the trial judge to acknowledge the expert evidence reflects clearly a 
suspicion of psychiatric classification of personality disorder. Third, the judge 
assumed – in line with the moral rather than medical model of responsibility - 
that even if the defendant was suffering from such a disorder, it was not 
necessarily the case that he was unable to exercise responsible moral agency. 
Indeed, under the judge’s moral adjudication the defendant alone was to blame 
for his conduct. Notably, when engaging in his own moral adjudication of the 
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defendant’s behaviour the judge talks explicitly in the terms of the philosophy 
of action; emphasising the presence to his mind of both cognition (knowing 
how his actions affect others) and volition (the capacity to exercise self-
discipline). His failure of responsible moral agency was therefore culpable, and 
as such the enforcement of conditionality through exclusion was justified.  
 
(5) The impact of the DDA on the control of anti-social behaviour through 
housing management: the ramifications of Romano 
 
It is against the problematic construction of the risky and irresponsible 
tenant that I want to assess the impact of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
on the control of anti-social behaviour by social landlords. The DDA was 
designed to tackle discrimination against disabled people by imposing duties 
on individuals and organisations in three key areas: employment, education 
and access to goods and services. The latter category extends to housing. 
Sections 22 to 24 prohibit three broad forms of housing-related discrimination. 
First, a person with the power to dispose of premises is prohibited from 
discriminating against a disabled person in the terms on which he offers to 
dispose of those premises; by refusing to dispose of those premises; or in the 
way he allocates those premises.91 Second, it is also unlawful for a person 
managing any premises to discriminate against a disabled person occupying 
those premises (whether a tenant or a member of the tenant’s household) in 
the way he permits him to make use of any benefits or facilities, by refusing or 
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deliberately omitting to permit him to make use of any benefits or facilities 
comprised in a lease; or by evicting him, or subjecting him to any other 
detriment.92 Finally, a person whose licence or consent is required for the 
disposal of premises must not discriminate against a disabled person by 
withholding that licence or consent.93 
Notably, the DDA protects only those individuals whose ‘mental 
impairment’ has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities.94 It focuses specifically then upon 
conditions that place them at particular risk of social exclusion, representing an 
important first step in the promotion of the SEU’s objectives. Sections 22 to 24, 
in particular, mirror the emphasis placed by the SEU upon access of the 
mentally disordered to housing. Problematically, however, the definition of 
mental impairment includes the types of mental disorder, discussed above, 
which can give rise to the kind of challenging behaviour that might form the 
basis of complaints to housing managers by other residents. It was not until 
March 2003, eight years after the passing of the legislation, that the impact of 
the DDA on the capacity of a social landlord to control such behaviour became 
apparent. Both the initial High Court decision in North Devon Homes v 
Brazier95 and the subsequent Court of Appeal judgment of Lord Justice Brooke 
in Manchester City Council v Romano96 focused upon the effect of the DDA on 
the power of a social landlord to evict a mentally disordered occupier from a 
secure or assured tenancy on grounds of their nuisance behaviour. The 
litigation came as a considerable shock to social landlords, who had apparently 
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failed to appreciate the impact of the DDA upon housing management before 
this point. As Brooke LJ explained in the Romano case, the Court of Appeal 
were ‘told by very experienced leading counsel that it was the publicity given to 
[the Brazier] judgment in March 2003 which attracted general attention for the 
first time to the possible need for a court to take the 1995 Act into account 
when assessing the reasonableness of making a possession order’. 97 
The decisions confirm the following. Under the Housing Acts 1985 and 
1988, governing the right to possession of a secure and assured tenancy 
respectively, a court must satisfy itself that it is reasonable to evict an occupier 
for anti-social behaviour. However, if it is found that the eviction is 
discriminatory under the DDA, and is unjustified, it will be inherently 
unreasonable for a county court to grant a possession order. A landlord 
discriminates against a disabled person under the DDA if ‘for a reason which 
relates to the disabled person’s disability, he treats him less favourably than he 
treats or would treat others to whom that reason does or would not apply’.98 
The seminal decision of the Court of Appeal in Clark v Novacold99 ensures an 
extremely broad interpretation of this definition. First, the reason for particular 
treatment need not be motivated by simple hostility towards a disability per se, 
but by any characteristic with a causal connection to that disability. It extends, 
as such, to the control of anti-social behaviour arising from a mental 
impairment, even if a landlord is unaware of the underlying condition. Second, 
the theoretical comparator test employed to identify whether the treatment is 
less favourable is unlike the tests under the race and sex discrimination 
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legislation. These demand that the effect of treatment on a person with a 
particular status should be compared with that of a person without that status 
in otherwise broadly similar circumstances. The comparator under the DDA, on 
the other hand, is someone, whether disabled or not, without the related 
characteristic giving rise to the treatment. As such, the perpetrator of anti-
social behaviour should be compared with an individual who does not act in 
that way, rather than a non-disabled individual who behaves in that manner. It 
is irrelevant that a landlord would have reacted in the same way to anti-social 
behaviour that was not the result of a mental impairment. 
The upshot of this approach then is that any prohibited act by a social 
landlord in response to conduct related to a relevant mental impairment (in this 
case, the bringing of possession proceedings), whether or not it is aware of 
that impairment, will always amount to prima facie discrimination. However, the 
DDA does not preclude the landlord from regaining possession of a property in 
such circumstances. The statute sets out instead a ‘fixed list’ of justifications 
that can legitimise discriminatory treatment. The only relevant justification in 
the context of anti-social behaviour is that the occupier poses a danger to 
others.100 The justification has two parts. The landlord must be of the opinion 
when it decides to regain possession of the property that eviction is necessary 
to prevent the endangerment of another’s health or safety. The court must then 
satisfy itself that it was reasonable, given all the circumstances of the case, for 
the landlord to hold that opinion. As the Court of Appeal noted, given the 
breadth of the definition of less favourable treatment, satisfying this justification 
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is absolutely key to a social landlord wishing to avoid discriminating against a 
tenant.101 The DDA has consequences not only for the eviction of secure and 
assured tenants, but all attempts to exclude an individual from social housing. 
It will be discriminatory for a social landlord to evict from an introductory, 
‘probationary’ or demoted tenancy in response to behaviour caused by a 
mental impairment. The DDA also explicitly prohibits discriminatory allocation 
procedures. An outright refusal by a social landlord to allocate premises will be 
prima facie unlawful, whether under general waiting lists or, in the case of 
LHAs, under homelessness allocations. So too will the decision to place an 
individual at a lower point on their lists.  
Although this paper focuses upon the impact of the DDA upon exclusion 
from social housing, it should be noted that the legislation also extends to other 
technologies for the governance of perpetrators. A social landlord may be 
precluded from reducing the security of recalcitrant occupiers. Section 22(3)(c) 
states, in full, that ‘[i]t is unlawful for a person managing any premises to 
discriminate against a disabled person occupying those premises by evicting 
the disabled person, or subjecting him to any other detriment.’ ‘Detriment’ is an 
expansive term, extending to treatment of such a kind that the individual 
affected ‘would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his 
detriment’.102 Whilst introductory or probationary tenancies apply to all new 
tenants and are therefore inherently indiscriminate, the extension of the 
tenancy by a further six months, with the further loss of security this entails, 
would clearly be viewed by an LHA occupier as detrimental. This should also 
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be the case with demotion. Housing managers also have recourse to powers 
ancillary to their management of housing: the statutory housing injunctions103 
and the ASBO.104 As the Court of Appeal suggests, unless justified it may well 
be illegal under the DDA for a landlord to seek sanction for breach of either 
tool.105  
 
 (6) The call for reform 
 
The DDA has been criticised from its inception for failing to effectively 
protect the disabled. Commentators argue in particular that it is under-inclusive 
in its definition of disability106 and that the justificatory provisions legitimate too 
many discriminatory practices.107 As the product of political expedient, it is said 
to represent ‘at best, half measures and reluctant reform’;108 a critique that 
extends to the provisions on access to premises, with the accusation that 
sections 22 to 24 are ‘both too narrow and too weak’.109 However, following 
Romano the DDA has, for the first time, become the subject of criticism for 
appearing to impinge disproportionately in practice upon the interests of the 
non-disabled. Brooke LJ expressed concern that as ‘policy-driven modern 
legislation which has not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny’,110 it could lead 
to ‘absurd and unfair consequences’ for those subject to its provisions, 
concluding that ‘Parliament ought to review [the] legislation at an early date’.111 
Sections 22 to 24, notably, were added to an already hasty bill almost as an 
afterthought at a late stage in its progress through Parliament.112 It is likely 
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then that the problems they might pose for the control of behaviour caused by 
mental disorder were left unconsidered. The Court of Appeal was therefore 
right to suggest that the government would be well-advised to examine closely 
the ramifications of the legislation for the range of providers it affects. 
An exhaustive discussion of the possible negative ramifications of the 
DDA, or even those provisions relating specifically to premises, is beyond the 
scope of this article.113 It can be noted briefly, however, that social landlords 
face a variety of problems beyond the control of anti-social behaviour, leading 
one commentator to conclude that the DDA now ‘presents a major 
encroachment on management of housing stock’.114 The Court of Appeal, for 
instance, raised the possibility that a landlord will be precluded by the 
legislation from evicting an individual for rent arrears if his inability to pay is 
related to a mental impairment, in the absence of any economic justification for 
less favourable treatment.115 Barr and Glover-Thomas also suggest that the 
DDA undermines the effective management of short- to medium-term 
supported housing for the mentally vulnerable,116 by preventing the operational 
flexibility required to run such projects. One of their concerns is the effective 
control of anti-social behaviour within these institutions. They are equally 
worried, however, that a housing manager will be unable to evict an occupier 
as part of his support or treatment, either in order to rehouse him in more 
suitable accommodation, or because he is no longer in need of the services, 
‘even though it would be intended (and may be necessary) to further both the 
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objects of the charity and the objective best interests of the housed 
individual’.117  
Returning to the specific impact of the DDA on the control of anti-social 
behaviour, however, it is contended that, superficially at least, the legislation 
may actually improve upon social landlords’ current governance of the anti-
social by encouraging greater co-operation between housing and medico-
welfare professionals. First, as we have seen, even if a housing provider is 
unaware that a perpetrator of anti-social behaviour has a mental 
impairment,118 or that his behaviour is caused by that impairment, it may still 
discriminate against him under the DDA by taking steps to control his conduct. 
To ensure compliance with the legislation a social landlord would be well-
advised to identify whether or not the perpetrator has a causal mental 
impairment when deciding how to respond to a particular case of anti-social 
behaviour. This may encourage providers otherwise reluctant to engage with 
the knowledge and expertise of medico-welfare professionals, and perhaps 
increase preventative use of support and treatment rather than exclusion. As 
the Court of Appeal conceded: 
 
‘This judgment shows that landlords whose tenants hold secure or 
assured tenancies must consider the position carefully before they decide 
to serve a notice seeking possession or to embark on possession 
proceedings against a tenant who is or might be mentally impaired. This 
is likely to compel a local housing authority to liaise more closely with the 
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local social services authority at an earlier stage of their consideration of a 
problem that might lead to an eviction than appears to be the case with 
many authorities, to judge from some of the papers the DRC [Disability 
Rights Commission] placed before the court.’119 
 
The DDA may also encourage the exclusion of the mentally disordered 
from social housing is legitimated only as a very last resort. Under the 
legislation a housing manager must hold a reasonable opinion that the 
treatment is ‘necessary’ to prevent an established risk to health or safety. It is 
contended that this could provide an opportunity for a defendant to argue that 
a landlord has failed to take adequate steps to assess the benefits of 
alternative measures that might be employed to manage the risk an individual 
poses. As Brooke LJ states in Romano, a social landlord ‘must prove that if it 
did not take this action someone’s health or safety would be endangered’.120 
The role of alternative remedies is particularly important when a social landlord 
decides to bring possession proceedings. Under the reasonableness 
requirement for possession of an assured or secure tenancy, the suitability of 
alternatives to eviction is currently an irrelevant consideration,121 yet landlords 
have available to them a range of other housing management tools; in 
particular injunctions and ASBOs, that do not threaten a mentally disordered 
occupant with homelessness. It may well be the case that support or treatment 
of the condition is a more appropriate solution to the problem. It should be 
remembered, of course, that the ‘health or safety’ justification requires only that 
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a landlord has a reasonable opinion that less favourable treatment is 
necessary. A court must therefore simply gauge whether the decision falls 
within the range of reasonable opinions that the landlord could have reached. 
This standard makes it far less likely that a court will challenge the choice of 
response than if it were empowered to reach its own conclusion on the matter. 
However, the requirement may still have an important procedural role to play. It 
has been held that an opinion is reasonable only if formed following ‘sufficient 
inquiry’ into the circumstances of the case.122 As such, a landlord should be 
expected at the very least to provide documentary evidence that it has 
considered alternative responses to the complaints levelled at an occupier. 
Irrespective of the potential procedural benefits of DDA, however, the 
Romano decision has been greeted predominantly with consternation because 
of the substantive restrictions it imposes upon the governance of anti-social 
behaviour by social landlords. The following sections explore these criticisms, 
contending that they reflect the conflict that exists between the ostensibly 
welfarist objectives of social housing provision and the competing advanced 
liberal discourses of risk and responsibility. 
 
(a) Conflicting systems of risk 
 
Unlike other characteristics such as race or sex warranting protection 
under anti-discrimination legislation, the framers of the DDA recognised that 
the disabled, given their physical or mental weaknesses, may in certain 
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circumstances represent a risk to others. This was the reason for the existence 
of the ‘health or safety’ justification. Problematically, however, the concepts of 
‘health’ and ‘safety’ employed by the legislation limit social landlords to the 
management of a particular spectrum of risk. Drawn as it is from the lexicon of 
the workplace,123 it is terminology normally associated with accidents arising 
from the hazards of the industrial environment; with unexpected physical 
illness and injury. This was indeed the immediate conclusion of David Steele J 
in the Brazier case, the precursor to Romano, who assumed that eviction 
would be unlawful under the DDA because the behaviour of the defendant did 
not constitute ‘an actual physical risk’ to other residents.124 Anti-social 
behaviour policies, on the other hand, are concerned with a far broader array 
of risks which do not necessarily impact directly upon an individual’s physical 
integrity, ranging from untidy gardens to noise pollution. This reflects to an 
extent the government’s acceptance of Wilson and Kelling’s influential ‘broken 
windows’ thesis, which argues that low-level disorder, if left uncontrolled, can 
lead to the degeneration of communities.125  
Protection from these low-level risks is also increasingly recognised as a 
human right.  Residents of social housing affected by anti-social behaviour, 
whether caused by a mental disorder or not, are likely to have had their Article 
8 rights infringed.126 Strasbourg jurisprudence attests that a person’s private 
life extends to both physical and psychological integrity.127 Even low-level 
disorder such as noise might fall within the ambit of Article 8 if it were to ‘affect 
individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a 
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way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, 
seriously endangering their health’.128 Local housing authorities, as public 
authorities, have a particular duty to actively protect and promote the Article 8 
rights of citizens, including prevention of interference by others with the quality 
of their home life.129 Moreover, legislators are expected to ensure that statutes 
such as the DDA do not impact disproportionately upon those rights.130 
However, because less favourable treatment can only be justified when the 
health or safety of a person is endangered, the DDA precludes a landlord from 
taking action where no such threat exists. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, given the political salience of anti-social 
behaviour, that the Court of Appeal’s response to this conflict of legislative risk 
systems was a bout of judicial activism that has effectively neutralised sections 
22 to 24. Ignoring David Steele J’s purposive interpretation of the justification 
in Brazier, Lord Justice Brooke decided to draw instead upon the definition of 
the World Health Organisation, that health constitutes ‘a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity’.131 It is contended that the inclusion of social, as well as physical 
and mental well-being, within the definition of health has broadened the 
concept to include all forms of anti-social behaviour that might form the subject 
of legal action. Any conduct that negatively affects his own subjective 
assessment of his quality of life in and around his home will endanger an 
individual’s well-being, whether or not it has any lasting effect on his bodily or 
psychological integrity. Even after adopting the WHO definition, Brooke LJ was 
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still convinced that the justification would not extend to all the risks a landlord 
might expect to manage under the rubric of anti-social behaviour, suggesting 
that behaviour that did not threaten health or safety, but caused house prices 
to decrease, could not be dealt with, even by an injunction.132 However, his 
Lordship’s concern seems unfounded, given that it must doubtless be the case 
that social well-being will always be threatened by a decrease in the general 
amenity of a neighbourhood serious enough to affect the housing market. 
Interestingly, application of the WHO definition of health has been 
employed as an interpretative technique before. When the British government 
attempted to attack the legality of the EC Working Time Directive on grounds 
that it did not fit within the head of ‘health or safety’ legislation, the European 
Court used it to expand the power of the EC to extend its control over areas of 
social policy.133 However, it may not be so simple to neutralise another piece 
of welfarist legislation that has created similar conflicts with the broader risk 
management associated with anti-social behaviour. The Children Act 1989 
imposes a duty on a local authority to safeguard and promote the welfare of a 
child in its care, unless it is ‘necessary, for the purpose of protecting members 
of the public from serious injury’.134 In a recent High Court decision, it has been 
suggested that a council may well be precluded from imposing an ASBO when 
the risk to others falls below this level.135 The risk system focuses solely upon 
physical integrity, and it is unlikely that the higher courts will be able to find a 
way to bring the legislation into line with the lower risk threshold demanded by 
anti-social behaviour policies.  
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 (b) Patronising the mentally disordered?  
  
The Court of Appeal acted then to ensure that housing providers are able 
to protect residents and their communities from the full spectrum of risks 
associated with anti-social behaviour. This, however, is not the only criticism 
levelled at the DDA. A rather different, and far more interesting, concern is to 
be found in the reaction of Andrew Arden QC, counsel for Manchester City 
Council in the Romano decision, in a subsequent editorial on the case. Clearly 
assuming that the WHO definition of health still precluded landlords from taking 
action in certain circumstances to protect residents from low-level anti-social 
behaviour, he described the DDA as granting the mentally disordered:  
 
‘[a] somewhat peculiar (and, perhaps, patronising) entitlement to 
make others’ lives uncomfortable if not downright miserable … [which] 
provokes the very sort of hostility the Act is intended to avoid, and denies 
the disabled the very acceptance that the Act is intended to secure’.136  
 
It is contended that this passing comment reflects the broader debates which, 
as we have seen, surround adjudication of the capacity of the mentally 
disordered for responsible moral agency.  
Under a moral model an individual is not absolved from responsibility for 
his behaviour simply because he has been diagnosed with a mental disorder. 
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For him to be exculpated it is necessary to show instead both a causal link 
between the disorder and particular anti-social conduct, and the breakdown of 
an individual’s power of cognition or volition. Where causal conduct is neither 
the product of compulsion nor delusion, which appears to be mostly the case, 
a particular moral adjudicator may construct the presence, or otherwise, of 
moral responsibility for his actions. The DDA, however, rejects this moral 
model. It provides that where no risk to health or safety exists, any conduct 
‘related’ to a relevant mental impairment cannot form the basis of less 
favourable treatment by a housing provider. The upshot is that a landlord in 
such circumstances will be precluded from excluding an individual, even when 
he might be judged on a particular moral adjudication as responsible for the 
behaviour that forms the complaint against him. The extent to which he might 
be capable of controlling his disorder, and/or his ‘meta-responsibility’ for 
creating or exacerbating that condition, will be irrelevant.137  
Returning once again to the particular example of the personality 
disorder, we can see clearly the consequences of the DDA for moral 
adjudication. Personality disorder is recognised by the legislation as a mental 
impairment. The ISD constitutes an appropriate source for this purpose,138 
which explicitly recognises the condition. Diagnosis of a personality disorder 
will result in this assumption of non-responsibility under the DDA, even though 
conduct is arguably an anti-social character trait, for which an individual should 
always be held responsible. Moreover, the application of the DDA rests upon 
what we have seen is an extremely unpredictable psychiatric classification. 
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Currently, ‘the existence or not of a mental impairment is very much a matter 
for qualified and informed medical opinion’.139 As such, the protection afforded 
to individuals under the legislation is likely to be uneven and subject to 
inevitable controversy. Indeed, the problem may increase under the Disability 
Discrimination Act 2005, which will soon remove the requirement that a 
disorder must be ‘clinically well-recognised’.140 Identification of a mental 
impairment will then no longer need to be substantiated by a respected body of 
medical professionals, increasing the possibility of a court accepting 
controversial diagnoses. 
What the DDA has effectively achieved is the imposition into law of the 
medical model’s assumption of non-responsibility. It is an outcome that creates 
a number of possible problems. The most obvious perhaps is that the power of 
providers to encourage individuals to take responsibility for their conduct 
through conditionality in their housing provision is weakened. Protected by the 
legislation, at least in the absence of a risk to health or safety, an individual 
that might be judged capable of exercising responsible moral agency will no 
longer be amenable to exclusion from social housing as a technology of self. 
Nor will it possible to discipline him through the act of exclusion itself. Arden, 
however, has a different concern. His suggestion is that the legislation harms 
not only housing providers but, ironically, the mentally disordered themselves. 
He notes first the possible negative impact of the DDA upon perceptions of the 
mentally disordered. Enabling them to avoid responsibility for their anti-social 
conduct, where it may be deemed to exist under a moral adjudication, might 
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lead to hostility towards those assumed to have unfairly ‘got away with it’. He 
then goes on to question whether it may patronise the mentally disordered to 
treat them in this way. To patronise, as to condescend, is to behave as if one is 
on equal terms with another person, whilst maintaining an attitude of 
superiority. Whilst the legislation ostensibly promotes the equality of the 
mentally disordered, in practice it seems to confirm their inferiority by 
assuming, prejudicially, that they are inherently non-responsible agents.  
Securing the dignity of minority groups lies at the heart of anti-
discrimination law.141 The enactment of the DDA was expected by the 
Disability Rights Movement to secure dignity for the disabled by promoting 
their equality. Brian Doyle, for example, argued as follows in support of civil 
rights:  
 
‘Throughout history disabled people have experienced social 
discrimination, segregation and exclusion. They have been characterized 
as incomplete or defective human beings, subjected at one extreme to 
neglect, persecution and death, and at the other extreme to charity, social 
welfare and paternalism’.142  
 
By treating non-responsibility as the natural concomitant of a mental disorder, 
however, the DDA arguably characterises protected individuals indiscriminately 
as incomplete or defective human beings. The blanket protection from 
exclusion from social housing provided to them, at least where they do not 
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constitute a risk to health or safety, appears to amount then to just the sort of 
paternalism that these campaigners have sought to prevent. Interestingly, 
commentators are also increasingly disillusioned by the medical model itself, 
for impinging upon the dignity of the mentally disordered in this way. As Veatch 
points out: 
 
‘They recognise that to place an individual in the medical model is to 
remove blame, but to remove blame is to remove responsibility, and to 
remove responsibility is to challenge the dignity of the individual’.143 
 
The DDA restricts the opportunity for social landlords to encourage the 
mentally disordered to take responsibility for their conduct through 
conditionality of housing provision, either as a technology of self or as a 
disciplinary technique. What is interesting is that this restriction appears to 
extend the DDA beyond the appropriate boundaries of anti-discrimination 
legislation. The primary liberal justification for contemporary discrimination law 
is the promotion of equal treatment of those who, because of a particular 
status, would otherwise be treated unjustly less favourably than others.144 
Sandra Fredman expands upon this conception of equality: 
 
‘A key contribution of liberal equality has been its insistence that 
individuals should be judged according to their personal qualities. This 
basic tenet is contravened if individuals are subjected to detriment on the 
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basis only of their status, their group membership, or irrelevant physical 
characteristics’.145 
 
A particular protected ‘status’ should not form the basis of less favourable 
treatment because it is extrinsic to a person’s ‘personal qualities’: it is irrelevant 
because it has no bearing upon the merits (or demerits) of the individual 
himself. The distinction between status and personal quality is an 
uncontroversial dichotomy when applied to physical conditions such as race 
and sex. In relation to mental disorder, however, the distinction becomes 
blurred by the question of responsibility. If an individual is adjudicated as 
responsible for conduct, notwithstanding diagnosis of a causal mental disorder, 
it is arguable that his anti-social conduct should be treated as a personal 
quality, rather than part of his status as a disabled person. It should therefore 
appropriately form the basis of the same treatment as non-disabled individuals 
who behave in the same way.  
It is notable, finally, that the framers of the DDA appear to have 
problematized this assumption of non-responsibility themselves. During the 
passage of the DDA through Parliament, William Hague made clear that he 
would ensure that ‘psychopathic or antisocial disorders and addictions’, such 
as ‘kleptomania, pyromania, paedophilia and personality disorders’ would not 
be protected by the legislation.146 The Disability Discrimination (Meaning of 
Disability) Regulations 1996 provided consequently that certain personality 
disorders - a tendency to set fires, to steal or to physical or sexual abuse, 
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exhibitionism or voyeurism - were excluded from the meaning of disability,147 
together with addictions to alcohol, nicotine or other substances, unless 
caused by medical treatment.148 Of course, the 1996 Regulations clearly were 
not aimed at securing the dignity of the mentally disordered. Instead, imposing 
responsibility upon these particular individuals reflects a knee-jerk, politically-
motivated moral adjudication of certain social demons who would attract public 
outrage should they be allowed the benefits of protection from discrimination. 
What the exceptions do reveal though is a suspicion of the medical status of 
personality disorders. Further, the exclusion of addictions, aside from those not 
brought about by the individual himself, suggests subscription to the theory of 
meta-responsibility. However, the regulations do not exclude all personality 
disorders. Nor do they seem to deal with questions of responsibility that might 
arise from dual diagnosis. Even if the substance misuse amounts to an 
addiction, which will not always be the case, anti-social behaviour will still be 
related to some extent to the underlying medical condition and will therefore 
fall within the ambit of the DDA. 
 
(6) Reprioritising welfarism? 
 
The accusation that the DDA patronises the mentally disordered by 
freeing them from responsibility for their conduct reflects the concern of 
advanced liberalism with the fostering of responsible moral agency. It is 
questionable, however, whether an adjudication of moral responsibility on the 
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part of these individuals is best responded to through conditionality in housing 
provision. That responsibility can be causally attributed to an individual does 
not necessarily provide grounds for the blame of that individual.149 It is another 
question entirely whether he should be subjected to exclusion from his home 
as a result. We have seen that ‘anti-social’ individuals protected by the DDA 
share one important characteristic: they are at particular risk of social exclusion 
because their mental impairments substantially affect their capacity to carry out 
day-to-day activities. As the SEU report suggests, to tackle the social exclusion 
experienced by the mentally disordered it is necessary to get the basics of 
housing provision right. Encouraging responsible moral agency through 
conditionality is of little value relative to this objective. It is contended then that, 
in the context of conditionality at least, the DDA is a welcome return to 
welfarism within the sector. 
It is questionable too whether the assumption of non-responsibility in 
these circumstances is necessarily at odds with the aims of anti-discrimination 
legislation. In fact, equal treatment is not the only appropriate objective for 
such instruments. Departure from the principle is often justified as a way to 
ensure substantive or redistributive goals.150 Collins develops this idea by 
suggesting that legislators should be able to depart from the principle of 
equality when to do so promotes the distributive aim of greater social 
inclusion.151 It might be argued then that departure from the principle of 
equality treatment is warranted in order to ensure that the mentally disordered 
are provided with the housing services required to engage effectively with 
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society, whether or not this prevents them from taking responsibility for their 
actions through conditionality in their housing provision.152 We have seen that 
in this instance the DDA promotes less favourable treatment of the minority, 
rather than majority, group. It operates as such as a source of positive 
discrimination in favour of the mentally disordered. Indeed, Arden’s argument 
that it is patronising towards minority groups is often directed towards 
legislation which explicitly engages in affirmative action. It is contended that 
this outcome was clearly unintended by the framers of the DDA. However, 
under the redistributive objective of social inclusion, it might be argued that 
quality of outcome (securing adequate housing) justifies more favourable 
treatment of the minority group (precluding consideration of their responsibility 
for anti-social conduct).  
Of course, the re-prioritisation of welfarism through anti-discrimination 
legislation not only requires that individuals are absolved from responsibility for 
their conduct through conditionality, but that providers and other residents 
underwrite the risks that they might pose. We have seen that the Court of 
Appeal in Romano acted to allow providers to justify less favourable treatment 
on grounds of the low-level risks associated with anti-social behaviour. It might 
be argued finally, however, that the benefit of secure housing for the mentally 
disordered, the dubious practical benefits of exclusion of the mentally 
disordered from social housing for anti-social behaviour, and additionally the 
fact that only those dependent upon the tenure for their accommodation are 
liable for the loss of their home on ground of their conduct,153 supports a higher 
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justificatory risk standard than that set by the Court. Indeed, whilst we have 
seen that it is the human right of other residents to be protected from low-level 
disorder, legislation that demands that social landlords and other residents 
underwrite a higher proportion of the risks associated with mental disorder will 
still satisfy the European Convention. It is clear that a wide margin of 
appreciation exists for Parliament to legislate in areas of social policy, allowing 
for the rights and interests of others.154 The interest in securing stable housing 
of those whose mental impairment makes them particularly vulnerable to social 




This paper has explored the restrictions imposed by sections 22 to 24 of 
the DDA upon the governance of anti-social tenants through conditionality in 
housing provision. It has contended that the legislation conflicts with the 
objectives of advanced liberal housing policy, by reprioritising the need of the 
mentally disordered for social housing above the management of risk, and the 
shaping of responsible moral agency, through exclusion. It has explored in 
particular the argument that to absolve the mentally disordered indiscriminately 
from the obligations of conditionality is an affront to their dignity because many 
are capable of taking responsibility for their conduct. It has suggested, 
however, that social inclusion of the mentally disordered through the securing 
stable tenancies is of such fundamental importance that they should be 
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exempt from conditionality. This should still be subject to a risk justification, but 
arguably set at a higher standard than that currently set by the Court of Appeal 
in Romano. Moreover, it is not internally inconsistent for anti-discrimination 
legislation to engage in positive discrimination by preventing landlords from 
excluding individuals in this way. There may be a place then for the protections 
currently afforded under the DDA to the mentally disordered threatened with 
exclusion from rented housing on grounds of their anti-social conduct.  
We have seen, however, that numerous other problems are created for 
housing providers by sections 22 to 24. In relation to the control of anti-social 
behaviour, we saw earlier that the legislation may preclude social landlords 
from enforcing injunctions or ASBOs against the mentally disordered. It is 
suggested that the DDA has extended here beyond its appropriate remit. The 
focus of sections 22 to 24 is the support of access to premises. Neither the 
imposition of an injunction or ASBO impinges upon this objective. The 
inclusion of these tools should be seen instead as an unintended consequence 
of the overly broad notion of ‘detriment’ employed by the legislation. A further 
concern is that supported housing providers may be prevented from evicting or 
refusal to allocate in the best interests of the individual or the housing project. 
This may have to be dealt with through an exception for such projects. Finally, 
I want to return to a concern, raised earlier, that in the absence of an economic 
justification for less favourable treatment landlords are precluded by the DDA 
from evicting individuals from social housing for rent arrears on evidence of a 
causal mental impairment. This paradigm is particularly susceptible to criticism 
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under advanced liberal housing policy. It can be criticised first on grounds of 
risk to the financial viability of a particular housing organisation. Without 
modification such an application of DDA may well give rise to a challenge 
under Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention,155 as a landlord will 
effectively be deprived of his property without compensation. Moreover, the 
DDA also provides no opportunity for consideration of the responsibility of an 
individual for his or her condition. The DDA may once again be said to 
patronise him, by associating classification of a mental disorder with an 
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